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In this paper we follow the BOID (Belief, Obligation, Intention,
Desire) architecture to describe agents and agent types in Defeasi-
ble Logic. We argue that the introduction of obligations can provide
a new reading of the concepts of intention and intentionality. Then
we examine the notion of social agent (i.e., an agent where obliga-
tions prevail over intentions) and discuss some computational and
philosophical issues related to it. We show that the notion of so-
cial agent either requires more complex computations or has some
philosophical drawbacks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recent works on cognitive agents combine two apparently inde-
pendent perspectives [6, 14, 8, 7, 9, 10]: (a) a classical cognitive
account of agents that specifies their mental attitudes; (b) modelling
agents’ behaviour by means of normative concepts. For the first ap-
proach, the background is the belief-desire-intention (BDI) archi-
tecture, where mental attitudes are taken as primitives to give rise to
a set of Intentional Agent Systems [20, 4]. This view is interesting
especially when the behaviour of agents is the outcome of a ratio-
nal balance among their (possibly conflicting) mental states. The
normative aspect is rather based on the assumption that normative
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concepts play a role to characterise the idea of social co-ordination
of autonomous agents [19]. The nice result of this combination of
perspectives is that of leading to an account of agents’ deliberation
and behaviour in terms of the interplay between mental attitudes
and normative (external) factors such as obligations.
Following [14, 8, 7] we discuss how this combination can be
framed in Defeasible Logic (DL). As is well-known, DL is based
on a logic programming-like language and it is a simple, efficient
but flexible non-monotonic formalism able to deal with many dif-
ferent intuitions of non-monotonic reasoning and recently applied
in many fields. In addition, several efficient implementations have
been developed [17, 3]. Here we discuss and extend some aspects
of a non-monotonic logic of agency, based on the framework of [1],
developed in [8, 7]. Indeed, DL is one of the most expressive lan-
guages that allows for the definition of large sets of patterns called
agent types. Here, the focus will be in particular on philosophical
and computational aspects of the notion of social agent, by which
we mean a norm-complying agent.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the
theoretical background of our system. In particular, since the con-
cept of social agent focuses on the interplay between obligations
and intentions, we will discuss which kind of intentions have to be
considered in this regard. Section 3 will present our logical frame-
work, based on DL, which will embed our intuitions and permit to
deal with social agency. Some first conclusions will be provided
with reference to the problematic nature of social agents. Section 4
deals with the computational complexity of social agency.
2. SOCIAL AGENTS: OBLIGATION AND
INTENTION
This section provides some theoretical background for the rest of
the paper. Our focus is on the so-called policy-based attitudes. The
term was coined by Bratman [5] with specific reference to the idea
of intention. The intuition behind policy-based intention is based
on Bratman’s view regarding future directed intention and general
intention. Bratman terms general intentions as general/personal
policies. Along with general policies go policy-based intentions.
For example, I have a general policy to patch up and reboot the
Unix server in the department once every month. This morning, on
the basis of this policy, I form the intention to reboot the machine
at 7.00 pm in the evening. My intention this morning to reboot the
machine this evening is a policy-based intention. This specific in-
tention will play a major part in my planning process for the day as
it will pose problems about means and constrain my other options.
Based on this distinction Bratman makes the following classifica-
tion of intentions: deliberative, non-deliberative and policy-based.
The difference between the three is the following: When an agent
i has an intention of the form INTt1i ϕ, t2 (read as agent i intends at
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t1 to ϕ at t2) as a process of present deliberation, then it is called de-
liberative intention. On the other hand, if the agent comes to have
such an intention not on the basis of present deliberation, but at
some earlier time t0 and has retained it from t0 to t1 without recon-
sidering it, then this intention it is called non-deliberative. The third
case arises when intentions are general and concern potentially re-
curring circumstances in an agent’s life. Such general intentions
constitute policy-based intentions. A policy-based intention is not
a non-deliberative intention because it is not simply a case of re-
taining an intention previously formed. Neither is it a deliberative
intention since it is not based on a full-blown deliberation where
an attempt is made to weigh pros and cons for and against conflict-
ing options. It also differs from an intention in favour of necessary
means, i.e., intention in favour of a specific end, in the sense that
the defeasibility of general policies makes it possible to block the
application of the policy to the particular case without abandoning
the policy. Otherwise one could abandon the intention in favour of
the end. The difference here is that in each case the policy concerns
not just a single future situation, but a kind of circumstance that is
expected to recur in the agent loop and in each case the agent might
well have a general intention to act in the particular circumstances.
Whether the agent is able to perform that action or not depends on
the circumstances.
As argued in detail elsewhere [13], it may happen that a policy-
based intention needs to be re-considered if not blocked for the ap-
plication to particular cases. But this does not mean that the agent
should know all such conditions in a scenario, but only those she
considers necessary for the intended outcome and that she is not
confident of their being satisfied. To intend the necessary conse-
quence the agent has to make sure that all the evidence to the con-
trary has been defeated, which is basically a defeasible conclusion.
The starting point of this paper is to extend the policy-based ap-
proach to other attitudes and motivational factors such as beliefs
and obligations. In this way, all motivational factors are represented
within a rule-based system: intentions and beliefs are viewed as
constituting the internal constraints (based on policies) of an agent
while obligations are her external constraints (based on rules). As
constraints they are defeasible. Notice, in particular, that such
an extension to obligations can capture the well-known defeasible
character of deontic reasoning. In this last case, a policy-based
obligation –conceived of as an external motivational attitude– turns
out to be simply a conditional obligation, namely, a rule that allows
for the inference of an obligation whenever the antecedent of this
rule holds [18, 21].
2.1 Intentions and Normativity
According to Bratman, rational agents can be basically modelled
as follows:
• agents are goal-directed without being necessarily aware of
their activity;
• intentions are used to choose partial plans for the realisation
of a goal;
• not all consequences are intended but only some initial inten-
tions and the goal as a result of the plan; if some side-effects
occur, they are never intended.
It is worthy discussing here the notion of side-effect. This well-
known problem has to deal with several variants of logical omni-
science: the problem arises when the agent is required to know all
the truths defined by her logic, or when the logic that depicts the
agent automatically includes all the logical truths of classical logic,
or, finally, if the agent knows all the logical consequences of the
known propositions [12]. Indeed, the problem is usually referred
to as the expected side-effects problem [5], a problem which de-
pends on the interactions between the reasoning mechanism for the
propositional inferences and the mechanism ruling the introduction
and the behaviour of the modal operators. A simple and rather un-
satisfactory solution would be to consider two completely unrelated
consequence relations, one for the propositional part and the sec-
ond one for the modal operators. The consequence relation for a
modal operator is meant to give the condition under which one can
prove a modal formula. For example the pair Γ |∼X α , where X is
a modal operator, means that if we can prove all the formulas in Γ
then we can deduce Xα . In what follows we will develop a sys-
tem for mental states and motivational attitudes based on this idea.
However, we will allow the consequence relation for intentions and
obligations to interact with the propositional module and we will
also consider possible interactions between the modal operators.
To this end we have to show that the expected side-effects phe-
nomenon is not a drawback for policy-based agents: such a kind of
agents must accept the expected-side effects unless they have some
reasons to reject the consequences corresponding to them.
In effect, though our proposed theory does not entertain many of
the properties leading to logical omniscience, some aspects of the
side-effects problem are accepted. Consider
INTSmoke, Smoke→ Cancer |∼ INTCancer (1)
INTGoToRome, GoToRome→ GoToItaly |∼ INTGoToItaly (2)
Actually, whereas the first case is clearly unacceptable, the sec-
ond should be accepted by a rational agent. In this perspective the
side-effects problem is similar to the substitution of indiscernible
in opaque contexts. An agent may have the intention to visit Rome
and not to visit Italy. But if the agent knows that Rome is the cap-
ital of Italy then it would be irrational of the agent not to have the
intention to go to Italy given the intention to visit Rome.
Accordingly, some cases of the side-effects problem are not nec-
essarily a weakness of a theory. This holds in particular if we as-
sume that our agents are aware of their activities. In our view, mod-
elling rational agents corresponds to the following assumptions:
• agents are aware of their activities, of their policies;
• some cases of the side-effects problem can be accepted;
• if a case has to be rejected this means that its unpleasant con-
sequences should not be intended;
• when unpleasant consequences are not intended, this only
means that they are blocked by conflicting attitudes or facts.
The theory an agent is equipped with can be understood as the
specification of the behaviour of the agent. If the agent is aware
that B is an unavoidable/indisputable consequence of A and the
agent intends A, then B is a consequence of the agent’s intentions
and the agent must accept it as part of her intentions. Suppose
we have that “raising one’s hand at an auction counts as making a
bid”. Thus if the agent (aware of this policy) intends to raise her
hand, then she intends to bid in the auction, and her action will
be understood as making a bid. In other words, in our system we
will try to balance and moderate some unpleasant aspects of the
side-effects problem with the equally important need for modelling
rational agents. Of course, according to our view, we may have that
something is intended even if it is causally distant with respect to
the original derived intentions. But this is not necessarily a draw-
back if we conceive agents as rational and, as such, being aware
of the policies which are related with the environment and with
their interests: even a causally distant behaviour can be rationally
intended unless it is removed in the meantime from deliberation.
But this case is indeed considered within our analysis because we
may have concrete contexts in which some policy-based intentions,
as soon as they are applicable, turn out to be overridden by other
policies: we may have reasons to argue that, if an agent intends
A and believes that B is a consequence of A, this is not a reason
for necessarily intending B; in fact, the derivation of B as an inten-
tion may be blocked, in our view, by competing attitudes or made
non-applicable by concrete facts.
According to the previous discussion it should be clear that,
though inspired by Bratman’s [5] analysis, the notion of intention
we study in this paper is slightly different, as it focuses on the idea
of intentionality. In Bratman’s view intentions are used to choose
partial plans for the realisation of a goal; in this way they have a
close relation to means-ends. In our view intentions should be re-
lated not only to means-ends but also to the their consequences.
This concept of intention is particularly relevant in conjunction
with deontic and normative notions, for example if we want to say
that an agent is legally responsible for A if the agent did A with the
intention to do A. In such cases the agent has to include in the set
of her intentions not only her intentions in Bratman’s sense but also
some of their consequences. Our intuition is compatible with von
Wright’s [22] classical theory of normative actions. Von Wright’s
problem is to identify what should be the content of norms. He ar-
gues that norms should deal with actions. Roughly, actions can be
described in terms of state transitions and as the sets of all changes
of world that follow from them. It is not our purpose discussing
here von Wright’s theory of action. It should be noted, however,
that he considers the related problem of intentions. On the one
hand, von Wright is clear when he says that any action may have
an arbitrary number of consequences and not all of them are in-
tended. On the other hand, he provides a very broad concept of
action, according to which all actions in norms, strictly speaking,
are intentional. If so, what are the boundaries of intentions to be
considered when they interplay with obligations?
Let us see how to recast Bratman’s Strategic Bomber scenario
[5] in this perspective. The basic scenario runs as follows: Strate-
gic Bomber intends to bomb a munition plant of the enemy be-
ing aware that the resulting explosion will kill innocent children in
a nearby school. Bratman argues that Strategic Bomber does not
have the intention to kill the children. Let us expand the scenario
by supposing that despite the bombing, Strategic Bomber loses the
war, and that there is a process for war crimes against him. Civil
casualties are a sad but almost unavoidable consequence of war,
but usually the killing of civilians does not constitute a war crime
if there was no intention to kill. According to Bratman, Strategic
Bomber did not commit a war crime since he did not have such an
intention. However, let us assume that Strategic Bomber did not
do anything to prevent or minimise civil casualties (let us say by
a movement of troops that might have resulted in an evacuation of
the area surrounding the munition plant). In this extended scenario
the killing of children is brought about by a (successful) intentional
act of Strategic Bomber. Accordingly, he must be held responsible
for the killing of innocent civilians.
Given this interpretation of intentions, we will see in the rest of
this paper that some standard accounts of agent types, and of social
agents in particular, are not satisfactory. We provide now some
brief comments on the notion of agent type and social agent.
Classically, agent types are characterised by stating conflict res-
olution types in terms of orders of overruling between rules [6, 14,
7, 8]. In this perspective, agent types are meaningful within a non-
monotonic setting and are nothing but general strategies to detect
and solve conflicts between the different components of the cog-
nitive profiles of agent’s deliberation. In [6] 24 possible types are
identified while, in [8], based on a different framework, 20 com-
binations are proposed. Typically, rational agents are assumed to
be at least realistic: a realistic agent, in fact, is such that rules
for beliefs override all other components, as beliefs correspond to
agent’s account of how the environment is. If the realistic condition
is abandoned, we may have situations where intentions and desires
override beliefs, thus leading to various forms of wishful thinking.
Given the minimal assumption that a rational agent should be re-
alistic, we may further constrain agent’s deliberation in order not to
violate obligations: a social agent type requires that obligations are
stronger than the other motivational components with the exception
of beliefs. Various forms of social agency correspond to assuming




In this paper we will consider only the interaction between inten-
tions and obligations. But, even confining the problem to these
components, the question at stake is: How to deal with social
agents? The simplest solution is the classical one, corresponding
to adopting schema (3): when we have two rules, one leading to
INTφ and the other to OBL¬φ , the former is blocked. Are we sure
that this classical view is sufficient, given the account of policy-
based attitudes we previously discussed?
3. BIO AGENTS IN DEFEASIBLE LOGIC
We focus on how beliefs, intentions and obligations jointly inter-
play in modelling agent’s deliberation and behaviour. In particular,
the system is meant to infer the goals the agent has to achieve.
The formal language contains modal literals and preferences, and
is defined as follows:
DEFINITION 1. Let M = {BEL, INT,OBL} be a set of modal
operators, and P a set of propositional atoms. The set of literals
is defined as L = P∪{¬p|p ∈ P}. If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the
complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then ∼q is ¬p;
and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p).
• The languageL is the smallest set including L and contain-
ing modal literals Xl and ¬Xl when l ∈ L is a literal and
X ∈M is a modal operator.
For X ∈ {BEL, INT,OBL}, we have that φ1, . . . ,φn →X ψ is a
strict rule such that whenever the premises φ1, . . . ,φn are indis-
putable so is the conclusion ψ . φ1, . . . ,φn⇒X ψ is a defeasible rule
that can be defeated by contrary evidence. A rule φ1, . . . ,φn;X ψ
is a defeater that is used to defeat some defeasible rules by support-
ing evidence to the contrary.
DEFINITION 2. A rule r consists of its antecedent (or body)
A(r) (A(r) may be omitted if it is the empty set), an arrow (→ for a
strict rule, ⇒ for a defeasible rule, and; for a defeater), and its
consequent C(r) (or head).
• The arrow is labelled with a modal operator X ∈
{BEL, INT,OBL}. If the arrow is labelled with BEL the rule
is for belief, and similarly for the other modal operators.
• Given a rule r, A(r) is a set of literals or modal literals, and
C(r) is a literal.
• Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in
R by Rs, the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd , the
set of defeasible rules in R by Rd , and the set of defeaters in
R by Rdft. R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent
q. If any R is labelled with X, that is RX , all expressions just
defined will refer to rules for X.
The purpose of the system is to derive modalised literals (goals),
with the exception of rules for beliefs. As we shall see, provability
for beliefs will not generate goals, as in our view beliefs concern
the knowledge an agent has about the world: they may contribute
to derive goals (here, intentions and obligations), but they are not in
themselves motivations for action. For example, the application of
p⇒OBL q permits to infer OBLq. Accordingly, modalities will not
occur in the consequents of rules to keep the system manageable.
DEFINITION 3. A defeasible agent theory is a structure D =
(F,RBEL,RINT,ROBL,>) where F is a finite set of facts, RBEL is a
finite set of rules for belief, RINT is a finite set of rules for intention,
ROBL is a finite set of rules for obligation, and >, the superiority
relation, is a binary relation over the set of rules.
The superiority relation > says when one rule may override the
conclusion of another rule. Facts are indisputable statements.
The following example illustrates the agent theory.
EXAMPLE 1. (RUNNING EXAMPLE). Frodo, our Tolkienian
agent, is entrusted by Elrond to be the bearer of the ring of power, a
ring forged by the dark lord Sauron. Frodo has the task to bring the
ring to Mordor, the realm of Sauron, and to destroy it by throwing
it into the fires of Mount Doom. However, Frodo loves the place
where he was born, the Shire, and intends to go there.
F = {INTGoToShire, EntrustedByElrond}
R= {r1 : EntrustedByElrond⇒BEL RingBearer
r2 : RingBearer⇒OBL DestroyRing
r3 : INTGoToShire⇒INT ¬GoToMordor
r4 : ¬GoToMordor⇒BEL ¬DestroyRing}
>= {r4 > r2}
3.1 Inferences with Social Agents
DEFINITION 4. Given an agent theory D, a proof in D is a
linear derivation, i.e, a sequence of labelled formulas of the type
+∆Xq, −∆Xq, +∂Xq and −∂Xq, where the proof conditions de-
fined in the rest of this section hold.
The meaning of the proof tags +∆X , −∆X , +∂X and −∂X is as
follows: +∆Xq means that q is definitly provable using only facts
and strict rules for X , −∆Xq means that it has been proved that q
is not definitely provable, +∂Xq that q is defeasibly provable in D
and −∂Xq that q is not defeasibly provable.
We start with some terminology. As was explained, the follow-
ing definition states the special status of belief rules, and that an
introduction of a modal operator corresponds to being able to de-
rive the associated literal using the rules for the modal operator.
DEFINITION 5. Let # ∈ {∆,∂}, and P = (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) be a
proof in D. A (modal) literal q is #-provable in P if there is a line
P(m) of P such that either
1. q is a literal and P(m) = +#BELq or
2. q is a modal literal X p and P(m) = +#X p or
3. q is a modal literal ¬X p and P(m) =−#X p.
A literal q is #-rejected in P if there is a line P(m) of P such that
1. q is a literal and P(m) =−#BELq or
2. q is a modal literal X p and P(m) =−#X p or
3. q is a modal literal ¬X p and P(m) = +#X p.
The definition of ∆X describes just forward chaining of strict rules:
+∆X : If P(n+1) = +∆Xq then
(1) q ∈ F if X = BEL or Xq ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ RXs [q] ∀a ∈ A(r) a is ∆-provable or
(3) ∃r ∈ RBELs [q] ∀a ∈ A(r) Xa is ∆-provable.−∆X : If P(n+1) =−∆Xq then
(1) q /∈ F if X = BEL and Xq /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ RXs [q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : a is ∆-rejected and
(3) ∀r ∈ RBELs [q] ∃a ∈ A(r) Xa is ∆-rejected.
For a literal q to be definitely provable we need to find a strict rule
with head q, whose antecedents have all been definitely proved pre-
viously. And to establish that q cannot be definitely proven we must
establish that for every strict rule with head q there is at least one
antecedent which has been shown to be non-provable. Condition
(3) says that a belief rule can be used as a rule for a different modal
operator in case all literals in the body of the rule are modalised
with the modal operator we want to prove. Thus given the rule
p,q→BEL s, we can derive +∆Y s if we have +∆Y p and +∆Y q.
Conditions for ∂X are more complicated. We define when a rule
is applicable or discarded. A rule for a belief is applicable if all
the literals in the antecedent of the rule are provable with the ap-
propriate modalities, while the rule is discarded if at least one of
the literals in the antecedent is not provable. For the other types
of rules we have to take complex derivations into account called
conversions [14]. In this paper we say there is a conversion from
X to Y if a rule fior X can also be used as a rule for Y . We have
thus to determine conditions under which a rule for X can be used
to directly derive a literal qmodalised by Y . Roughly, the condition
is that all the antecedents a of the rule are such that +∂Y a.
We represent all allowed conversions by a conversion relation c.
DEFINITION 6. Let a conversion relation c be a binary relation
over {BEL, INT,OBL}, such that (1) c(X ,Y ) stands for the conver-
sion of X rules into Y rules, (2) Y 6= BEL. Given a derivation P,
P(1..n) denotes the initial part of the derivation of length n.
• A rule r in RBEL is applicable iff ∀a ∈ A(r), +∂BELa ∈
P(1..n) and ∀Za ∈ A(r), where Z is a modal operator,
+∂Za ∈ P(1..n).
• A rule r in RBEL is discarded iff ∃a ∈ A(r) such that
−∂BELa ∈ P(1..n) or ∃Za ∈ A(r) such that −∂Za ∈ P(1..n).
• A rule r ∈ Rsd is applicable in the condition for ±∂Y iff
1. r ∈ RY and ∀a ∈ A(r), +∂BELa ∈ P(1..n) and
∀Za ∈ A(r) +∂Za ∈ P(1..n), or
2. r ∈ RX and ∀a ∈ A(r), +∂Y a ∈ P(1..n).
• A rule r is discarded in the condition for ±∂Y iff we prove
either −∂BELa or −∂Xa for some a ∈ A(r).
1. r ∈ RY and ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −∂BELa ∈ P(1..n) or
∃Za ∈ A(r) such that −∂Za ∈ P(1..n); or
2. r ∈ RX and ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −∂Y a ∈ P(1..n).
EXAMPLE 2. The rule a, INTb⇒BEL c is applicable if we can
prove both +∂BELa and +∂INTb.
EXAMPLE 3. If we have a type of agent that allows a deon-
tic rule to be converted into a rule for intention, c(OBL, INT),
then the definition of applicable in the condition for ±∂INT is
as follows: a rule r ∈ Rsd [q] is applicable iff (1) r ∈ RINT and
∀a∈ A(r),+∂BELa∈ P(1..n) and ∀Xa∈ A(r),+∂Xa∈ P(1..n), (2)
or r ∈ ROBL and ∀a ∈ A(r), +∂INTa ∈ P(1..n). In this second case,
for example, given the rule p,q⇒OBL s, we can derive +∂INTs if
we have +∂INTp and +∂INTq.
As a corollary of the definition of applicability, we can establish
when a literal is supported (see Section 4 for the use of this notion):
DEFINITION 7. Given a theory D = (F,RBEL,RINT,ROBL,>),
a literal l is supported in D iff there exists a rule r ∈ R[l] such
that r is applicable, otherwise l is not supported. For X ∈
{BEL, INT,OBL} we use+ΣX l and−ΣX l to indicate that l is sup-
ported / not supported by rules for X.
We are now ready to provide proof conditions for ±∂X :
+∂X :If P(n+1) = +∂Xq then
(1)+∆Xq ∈ P(1..n) or
(2.1) −∆X∼q ∈ P(1..n) and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] such that r is applicable; and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q], either s is discarded, or
(2.3.1) ∃t ∈ R[q] such that r is applicable and t > s
−∂X : If P(n+1) =−∂Xq then
(1) −∆Xq ∈ P(1..n) and either
(2.1) +∆X∼q ∈ P(1..n) or
(2.2) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q], either r is discarded, or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q], such that s is applicable, and
(2.3.1) ∀t ∈ R[q] either t is discarded, or t 6> s
To show that q is defeasibly provable we have two choices: (1)
We show that q is already definitely provable; or (2) we need to
argue using the defeasible part of a theory D. For this second case,
three (sub)conditions must be satisfied. First, we require that there
must be a strict or defeasible rule for q which can be applied (2.1).
Second, we need to consider possible reasoning chains in support
of ∼q, and show that ∼q is not definitely provable (2.2). Third,
we must consider the set of all rules which are not known to be
inapplicable and which permit to get ∼q (2.3). Essentially, each
such a rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to be provable, s must
be counterattacked by a rule t for q with the following properties:
(i) t must be applicable, and (ii) t must be stronger than s. Thus each
attack on the conclusion q must be counterattacked by a stronger
rule. In other words, r and the rules t form a team (for q) that
defeats the rules s. −∂Xq is defined in an analogous manner.
EXAMPLE 4. (RUNNING EXAMPLE; CONTINUED). Below is
the setC of all conclusions we get using the rules in R:
C = {RingBearer, INT¬GoToMordor, INT¬DestroyRing}
As facts, we know that Frodo has the primitive intention to go to
the Shire and that he has been entrusted by Elrond. These facts
make applicable rules r3 and r1, which permit to derive that Frodo
is the ring bearer and that he has the intention not to go to Mordor.
At this point we have a conflict if we assume c(BEL, INT). In
effect, given this conversion, r4 permits to derive that Frodo has
the intention not to destroy the ring while rule r2 should lead to the
obligation to destroy it. However, r4 is stronger than r2 and so we
only get +∂INT¬DestroyRing.
3.2 The Problem of Social Agents
As suggested in [7, 8], agent types can be characterised in DL as
follows:
DEFINITION 8. An agent type is defined by a set of pairs (X ,Y ),
X ,Y ∈ {BEL,OBL, INT}, such that for every r and r′ such that
r ∈ RX [q] and r′ ∈ RY [∼q], we have that r > r′.
While realistic agents are such that X =BEL and Y ∈ {INT,OBL},
social agents are such that X = OBL and Y = INT.
Unfortunately, this definition –adopted also in [6]– does not
guarantee that agent’s deliberation is oriented to fully complying
with obligations. This drawback is mainly due to the introduction
of conversions. Indeed, the notion of conversion should not sound
strange. In many formalisms we can convert from one type of con-
clusion into a different one. Take for example the right weakening
rule of non-monotonic consequence relations, where it is possible
to combine non-monotonic with classical consequences: B `C and
A |∼B imply A |∼C [15]. Here, conversions simply allow to ob-
tain conclusions modalised by a certain X through the application
of rules which are not modalised by X . In particular, they are fun-
damental in order to capture the fact that some side-effects should
be accepted insofar as they are consequences of policies of which
the agent is aware. Finally, some conversions seem useful to inte-
grate the basic idea of social agency. For example, we may have
agent types for which, given p⇒OBL q and +∂INTp, we can ob-
tain +∂INTq. Of course, this is possible only if we assume a kind
of norm regimentation, by which we impose that all agents intend
what is prescribed by deontic rules.
It is clear that our system admits three different types of inten-
tions and obligations. First, we have primitive intentions and obli-
gations when these are facts of the theory. But we can also have
what we may call primary and secondary intentions and obliga-
tions, depending on whether we accept at least basic conversions
via belief rules.
Let us consider Example 1. INTGoToShire is a primitive in-
tention. On the other hand, OBLDestroyRing –if it were derived
from rule r2– and INT¬GoToMordor are primary obligations and
intentions as they would be obtained without the use of conversions
(see Example 4). Finally, INT¬DestroyRing is a secondary inten-
tion because it is obtained from the rule r4 : ¬GoToMordor⇒BEL
¬DestroyRing and from +∂INT¬GoToMordor (again, see Example
4). It should be noted that OBLDestroyRing cannot be derived be-
cause r4 > r2, but this just amounts to assuming that the agent is
realistic: r4 is a belief rule whereas r2 is a deontic rule. In other
words, when we have in general that
a⇒OBL q b⇒BEL ∼q
+∂BELa +∂INTb
we are doomed to have social agents who cannot be truly social
since some of their (primitive) intentions lead to behaviours against
what would be otherwise obligatory for the agents. However, this
issue is not a matter of a direct conflict between rules for intentions
and obligations. Thus, to deal with norm-complying agents in these
scenarios and to restore their sociality we are required to change the
notion of agent type. We cannot anymore define it in terms of an
order of overruling between rules, but we have to focus on how
the conflicting literals are derived during the proof. Indeed, this
is feasible, but has a high computational cost, and even then we
cannot guarantee the sociality of an agent.
4. THE COST OF SOCIAL AGENTS
In this section we investigate the complexity of the defea-
sible logic for BIO agents where we assume the conversion
c(BEL,OBL) and c(BEL, INT) and then we turn our attention to
the complexity of social agents. We first introduce some notions to
make precise the definition of the issues at hand.
DEFINITION 9. Let # be one of the proof tags. Given a theory
D, D ` ±#p iff there is a derivation P in D such that for some n
P(n) =±#p.
DEFINITION 10. Given a theory D, the universe of D (UD) is
the set of all the atoms occurring in D; the extension of D (ED), is
defined as follows:
ED = (∆+,∆−,∂+,∂−)
where for X ∈ {BEL, INT,OBL}
∆+ = {Xl : D `+∆X l} ;
∆− = {Xl : D ` −∆X l} ;
∂+ = {Xl : D `+∂X l} ;
∂− = {Xl : D ` −∂X l} .
Two theories D and D′ are equivalent if and only if they have the
same extension, namely D≡ D′ iff ED = ED′ .
We now prove the main theorem about the complexity of our
defeasible logic. We show that the logic has linear complexity if
we compute the whole set of conclusions, i.e., the extension, of a
given theory.
THEOREM 1. For every theory D, ED can be computed in time
linear to the size of the theory, i.e., O(|UD| ∗ |R|).
PROOF. The proof is based on a modification of the algorithm
given by Maher [16] to show that propositional defeasible logic has
linear complexity.
The main idea of the proof is to build appropriate data structure
to implement a series of transformations reducing the complexity
of the rules, and where each literal and modal literal is examined
only once. The focal point of the transformations is based on the
following properties:
• Let D `+∂ p then
D∪{r : p1, . . . , pn, p⇒ q} ≡ D∪{r : p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q} .
• Let D ` −∂ p then D∪{r : p1, . . . , pn, p⇒ q} ≡ D.
The properties allow us (1) to remove already proved literals from
the body of rules and (2) to remove rules which have been dis-
carded.
The algorithm has three phases. (1) A pre-processing phase
where we use the transformations given in [2] to transform a theory
into an equivalent theory without superiority relation and defeaters;
the transformation is linear. (2) A rule loader that parses the theory
obtained in the first phase and generates the data structure that en-
codes the theory. (3) The inference engine applies transformations
to the data structure, where at every step it reduces the complexity
of the data structure.
The rule loader builds a data structure as follows: for every atom
α ∈UD we create three entries α , INTα and OBLα . Each entry
has associated to it a list of hash tables:
For α we have
• +h is a list of (pointers to) rules in RBEL where α appears in
the head;
• −h is the list of rules in RBEL where∼α appears in the head;
• +b is the list of rules in R where α occurs in the body;
• −b is the list of rules in R where ∼α occurs in the body.
For Xα , X ∈ {INT,OBL} we have
• +h is a list of rules in RX where α appears in the head;
• −h is the list of rules in RX where ∼α appears in the head;
• +hB is a list of rules in RBEL where α appears in the head;
• −hB is a list of rules in RBEL where ∼α appears in the head;
• +b is the list of rules in R where Xα occurs in the body;
• −b is the list of rules in R where X∼α occurs in the body.
• +b∼ is the list of rules in R where ∼Xα occurs in the body;
• −b∼ is the list of rules in Rwhere∼X∼α occurs in the body.
To each rule in RX , X 6= BEL, we associate a structure consisting
of a (modal) literal (the head of the rule) and a set of pointers to the
modal literals in the body of the rule, implemented as an hash table;
while for belief rules we create the same structure as the other types
of rules plus two other structures one for INT and one for OBL,
the single pointer refers to the modal literal and the set of pointers
corresponds to the literals in the body modalised, respectively, with
INT and OBL.
The Inference Engine is based on an extension of the Delores al-
gorithm/implementation proposed in [17] as a computational model
of Basic Defeasible Logic. In turn
1. It asserts each fact (as an atom) as a conclusion and removes
the atom from the rules where the atom occurs positively in
the body, and it “deactivates” the rules where either the atom
occurs negatively in the body, or incompatible modal literals
occur in the body.
2. It scans the list of active rules for rules where the body is
empty. It takes head and searches for rule (of the appropriate
type) where the head is the negation of the atom or a modal
literal incompatible with it. If there are no such rules then,
the atom is appended to the list of facts, and removed from
the rules
3. It repeats the first step.
4. The algorithm terminates when one of the two steps fails. On
termination the algorithm outputs the set of conclusions.1
It is immediate to see that the algorithm runs in linear time. Each
(modal) atom/literal in a theory is processed exactly once and every
time we have to scan the set of rules, thus the complexity of the
above algorithm is O(|UD| ∗ |R|).
Given the above result it might seem that social agents are computa-
tionally feasible. However, as we have seen in Section 3.1 there are
situations (let us call them deviant situations) where social agents
do not behave as expected. First of all, we have to identify when
we have a deviant situation and what are the reasons why we have
them, and what kind of control an agent has over them. Here we as-
sume that a deviant situation depends on some primitive intentions
of an agent (i.e., intentions given as facts). Since these intentions
are independent of the policy the theory describe the only alterna-
tive a social agent has is to give up some of them. In the rest of the
section we study whether this is possible and what price an agent
has to pay to be social. The answer is negative; we will provide
a theory that is essentially deviant, and we will show that social
agents are (computationally) expensive.
First of all we have to give a precise definition of the problem.
1This algorithm outputs ∂+; ∂− can be computed by an algorithm
similar to this with the “dual actions”. For ∆+ we have just to con-
sider similar constructions where we examine only the first parts of
step 1 and 2. ∆− follows from ∆+ by taking the dual actions.
Restoring Sociality Problem
INSTANCE:
Let I be a finite set of primitive intentions, OBLp a
primary obligation, and D a theory such that I ⊆ F ,
D ` −∂OBLp, D ` −ΣOBL∼p, D ` +∂INT∼p, D `
+ΣOBLp and D ` −ΣBEL∼p.
QUESTION:
Is there a theory D′ equal to D apart from containing
only a proper subset I′ of I instead of I, such that ∀q if
D `+∂OBLq then D′ ` ∂OBLq and D′ `+∂OBLp?
The specification of the problem is meant to formalise the situa-
tion we have described in the previous sections. The combination
of the proof tags in the specification of the instance is only possible
in case there is an applicable deontic rule for p (+ΣOBLp) which
would be otherwise unchallenged, i.e., there are no deontic rules
to support ∼p (−ΣOBL∼p) and there are no reasons to believe the
opposite, is defeated, against the sociality of the agent, by the in-
tentionality of ∼p obtained as a consequence of an intention of the
agent (this means it has been obtained by converting a belief rule
into an intention rule). In other terms a potentially valid obligation
is blocked by a consequence of an intentional behaviour.
EXAMPLE 5. Let us the consider the theory consisting of
F = {INTp, INTs}
R= {r1 : p,s⇒BEL q r2 : ⇒OBL ∼q r3 : ⇒BEL s}
>= {r1 > r2}
r1 is a belief rule and so the rule is stronger than the deontic rule
r2. In addition we have that the belief rule is not applicable (i.e.,
−ΣBELq) since there is no way to prove +∂BELp. There are no
deontic rules for q, so −∂OBLq. However, rule r1 behaves as an in-
tention rule since all its antecedent can be proved as intentions, i.e.,
+∂INTp and+∂INTs. Hence, since r1 is stronger than r2, the deriva-
tion of +∂OBL∼q is prevented against the sociality of the agent.
The related decision problem is whether it is possible to avoid the
“deviant” behaviour by giving up some primitive intentions, retain-
ing all the (primary) obligations, and maintaining a set of primitive
intentions as close as possible to the original set of intentions.
EXAMPLE 5. (CONTINUED). When we examine the theory we
notice that both primitive intentions concur to the prevention of the
derivation of +∂OBL∼q. These intentions are under the control
of the agent. The agent has the opportunity to avoid the deviant
behaviour if she gives up at least one of her primitive intentions.
Accordingly, the agent has three alternatives: to give up INTp, to
give up INTs, or to give up both. The first two options minimise
the difference between the original theory and the resulting theory.
There could be cases where, no matter what intentions are removed,
the theory will result in a deviant situation. The simplest case is
where there are intentions that are at the same time primitive and
primary.
EXAMPLE 6. Let the theory D be
F = {INTp}
R= {r1 : ⇒INT p r2 : p⇒BEL q r3 : ⇒OBL ∼q}
>= {r2 > r3}
In this theory we have only one primitive intention and therefore
the only way to see whether it is possible to avoid the problem is to
give up that intention. However, we have that r1 is an intention rule
for p, and thus we can use it to derive +∂INTp, which allows r2 to
be used to derive an intention instead of a belief, and consequently
to prevent the derivation of an obligation against the sociality of the
agent.
Notice that, given the non-monotonic nature of defeasible logic, it
is possible that a solution to the problem is given by a superset of
the original set of intentions instead of a subset.
EXAMPLE 7. Given a theory D as follows
F = {INTa, INTb}
RBEL = {r1 : INTa⇒BEL d, r2 : INTb⇒BEL d,
r3 : INTc⇒BEL ∼d, r4 : d⇒BEL e}
RINT = {r5 : ⇒INT a, r6 ⇒INT b}
ROBL = {r7 : ⇒OBL ∼e}
>= {r3 > r1,r3 > r2,r4 > r7}
As we have seen in the previous example, throwing away the two
primitive intentions is of no avail, they are reinstated by the inten-
tion rules r5 and r6. However, to block the side effect d of the two
intentions we can introduce a further primitive intention, INTc.
If we replace the theory D by a theory D′ obtained from D by
emptying the set of intention rules, then we have two alternatives
to avoid the deviance. The first is to drop both the primitive in-
tentions INTa and INTb, or we can form a new primitive intention
INTc. In this case the theory obtained from adding the new in-
tention is, intuitively, more similar to the original theory than the
theory obtained from dropping the two primitive intentions.
Variations of the problem can be obtained by changing other pa-
rameters of the specification. Some of these can define new types of
agents. For example a pro-active social agent might try to recover
from a deviant situation by changing the raw facts (facts that are
neither primitive intentions nor primitive obligations). Thus a pro-
active social agent tries to adapt the environment to her goals (in-
tentions). A legalistic social agent, on other the hand, might change
the set of primitive obligations, while a cheating social agent might
change the rules. However, it is important to realise that all these
variations have a structure isomorphic to the specification we dis-
cuss in this paper. In addition it is possible to generalise the prob-
lem to the case of multiple deviant behaviours.
THEOREM 2. The Restoring Sociality Problem is NP-complete.
PROOF. We have to show that the problem is both NP and NP-
hard. For the NP part all we have to do is to notice that we can
guess a theory, we compute the extension of the theory in linear
time (Theorem 1) and then verify in linear time whether the restore
conditions are satisfied.
For the NP-hard part we have to map a known NP-complete
problem to the Restoring Sociality Problem. Here we use the knap-
sack problem [11, Problem MP9].
Knapsack Problem
INSTANCE:
Given a finite set U , for each u ∈U a size s(u) ∈ Z+
and a value v(u) ∈ Z+, and integer B and K.
QUESTION:
Is there a subsetU ′ ⊆U such that ∑u∈U ′ s(u)≤ B and
∑u∈U ′ v(u)≥ K?
The knapsack problem is encoded by a defeasible theory D where
R is as follows:
• INTload(u)⇒BEL load(u) for each u ∈U .
• ∑s(u):D`+∂BELload(u) s(u)> B⇒INT overload




F is given by the relationship INTload(u) ∈ F iff u ∈U ′.
The theory of the above construction has several interesting
properties. First of all D ` +∂BELload(u) iff INTload(u) ∈ F ,
which means u ∈ U ′; then D ` +∂OBLgood iff either of the two
conditions of the knapsack problem are satisfied; notice that since
there are no literals for ¬load(u), the computation of the rule
INTload(u)⇒BEL load(u) can be computed independently of the
rest of the theory thanks to the modularity of DL [2], thus the sums
in the antecedent of the second and third rule can be considered as
“facts” in the theory. In case one of the condition of the knapsack
problem is not satisfied we have exactly a deviant situation as in the
restoring sociality problem. The encoding of the knapsack problem
in DL is clearly linear, thus any algorithm that solves the restoring
sociality problem in polynomial time will solve the knapsack prob-
lem in polynomial time. Therefore the restoring sociality problem
is NP-complete.
5. REVISING SOCIAL AGENTS
A first solution to the complexity of social agents is to avoid
conversions. However, we believe, that this is a rather unsatisfac-
tory approach for agents with both internal (intentions) and external
(obligations) motivational attitudes. It is not possible to capture the
notion of intentionality which is of paramount importance when we
deal with agents situated in legal contexts.
A second solution would be to assume that belief rules behaving
as intention rules (i.e., obtained from the conversion c(BEL, INT))
are always weaker than deontic rules or belief rules behaving as
deontic rules (i.e., where the conversion c(BEL,OBL) applies). In
this case the problem is with theory like
r1 : a⇒BEL q r2 : b⇒BEL ∼q
+∂INTa +∂OBLb
r1 > r2
where r1 is at the same time stronger and weaker than r2.
6. SUMMARY
The contribution of this paper is manifold. We extend the anal-
ysis of policy-based cognitive agents with the notion of obligation
and we argue that in such case side-effects do not endanger the log-
ical analysis but on the contrary are beneficial to explain notions,
e.g., intentionality, of paramount importance for agents situated in
legal contexts.
Policy based agents are represented in defeasible logic extended
with the modalities of belief, intention and obligation. This choice
was motivated by the computational feasibility of the logic. We
have demonstrated that the logic has linear complexity. As far as
we know this is the first result of this kind for cognitive agents.
Finally we have studied the notion of social agent and we have
proved that a proper and philosophically sound treatment of this
notion leads to an increase of the computational complexity of the
problem. Again this is the first result of this kind we are aware of.
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